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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Issue No. 1, Did the District Court err in concluding that the

proposed Seller Financing Addendum No. 1 ("SFA 1") to the Real Estate Purchase
Contract (the "REPC") between Johnson and the Wilsons was valid and enforceable
when it had not been executed, in writing, by Johnson or delivered to the Wilsons, by
Johnson, as required by the terms of SFA 1?
Standard of Review. The District Court's decision on summary
judgment is reviewed "for correctness, giving no deference to the court below." Giusti v.
Sterling Wentworth Corp,, 2009 UT 2; 201 P.3d 966 (Utah 2009).
Preservation of Issue on Appeal. In its Final Order and Judgment,
the District Court ruled that the REPC was a valid and enforceable agreement. (R. 605.)
Johnson filed her initial Notice of Appeal on February 19, 2009, within 30 days. (R.
610-12.) On March 3, 2009, the Wilsons filed a request for attorney's fees and costs.
(R. 613-14.) The Court entered an Order Amending Judgment to Include Attorney's
Fees and Costs on March 6, 2009. (R. 633-34.) After the District Court entered the
March 6, 2009 order granting Wilson's request for attorney's fees and costs, Johnson
filed an amended Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2009. (R. 644-46.)
2.

Issue No. 2. Assuming that SFA 1 was binding on the parties, did

the District Court err in concluding that the Wilsons were not in breach of SFA 1, thereby
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excusing further performance by Johnson under the REP(t, when the Wilsons failed, by
the time set for closing, to execute a promissory note and )xust deed for seller financing
consistent with the terms of SFA 1 ?
Standard of Review. The District Court's decision on summary
judgment is reviewed "for correctness, giving no deference to the court below." Giusti v.
Sterling Wentworth Corp,, 2009 UT 2; 201 P.3d 966 (Utah| 2009) (internal quotation
omitted).
Preservation of Issue on Appeal. In \\s Final Order and Judgment,
the District Court ruled that the Wilsons fully performed th^ir obligations stated in the
REPC and that Johnson breached the REPC. (R. 605.) Johiison filed her initial Notice of
Appeal on February 19, 2009, within 30 days. (R. 610-12.)! On March 3, 2009, the
Wilsons filed a request for attorney's fees and costs. (R. 61^-14.) The Court entered an
Order Amending Judgment to Include Attorney's Fees and Cjosts on March 6, 2009. (R.
633-34.) After the District Court entered the March 6, 2009|order granting Wilson's
request for attorney's fees and costs, Johnson filed an amended Notice of Appeal on
April 3, 2009. (R. 644-46.)
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAt PROVISIONS
The statutes of central importance to this appeal, Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-1 and
-3, are set out verbatim in Addendum A and Addendum B.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiffs, Scott and Tiffany Wilson (the "Wilsons") filed their Complaint
against Defendant Angela Johnson ("Johnson") on March 19, 2007, alleging that Johnson
had breached the terms of a Real Estate Purchase Agreement (the "REPC") to sell real
property located in St. George, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 1-7.) The District Court
entered an interim order, the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, on August 11,
2008 in favor of the Wilsons finding that an unsigned seller financing addendum was
binding on Johnson. (R. 583-89.) The District Court then entered a Final Order and
Judgment on January 21, 2009 in favor of the Wilsons, granting a second motion for
summary judgment filed by the Wilsons, and finding that Johnson had breached the terms
of the seller financing addendum and REPC by not conveying the Property to the
Wilsons. (R. 603-07.) Johnson filed her initial Notice of Appeal on February 19, 2009,
within 30 days. (R. 610-12.) On March 3, 2009, the Wilsons filed a request for
attorney's fees and costs. (R. 613-14.) The Court entered an Order Amending Judgment
to Include Attorney's Fees and Costs on March 6, 2009. (R. 633-34.) After the District
Court entered the March 6, 2009 order granting Wilson's request for attorney's fees and
costs, Johnson filed an amended Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2009. (R. 644-46.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Angela Johnson, ("Johnson") is the owner of property located at 704 South

Anasazi Circle, Washington, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 584.)
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Johnson listed the Property for sale on or (about December 1, 2006. The
Multiple Listing Service listing for the Property stated ah asking price of $1,300,000.00
and stated that "Owner finance available at 30 yr fixed 4|.9% interest. Call listing agent
regarding terms." (R. 102-03.)
3.

On or about January 6, 2007, Scott Wilson and Tiffany Wilson (the

"Wilsons") offered to purchase the Property from Johnson, offering to pay $1,100,000
with the Wilsons paying $20,000 in earnest money and $90,000 at closing, for a total of
f$TO0TOOO down knd Johnson seller-financing $990,000. (R. 584.)
4.

The Wilsons' offer (the "REPC") was made on a standard Real Estate

Purchase Contract form approved by the State of Utah, Division of Real Estate. (R. 584.)
5.

The initial offer specified that the purchase price would be paid through

seller financing and contained the following language:
There [X] are [ ] are not addenda to this Contract containing additional
terms. If there are, the terms of the following addenda are incorporated
into this Contract by this reference. [ ] Addendum No.l [X] Seller
Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption
Addendum [ ] Lead-Based Paint Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in
some transactions this disclosure is required by Law) [ ] Lead-Based
Paint Addendum (in some transactions this addendum is required by
Law) [X] Other (specify) Notice of Interest Addendum.
(R. 584.)
6.

Section 3 of the REPC provides as follows:

"Settlement" shall occur only when all of the following have been
completed: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each other or
to the escrow/closing office all documents required by this Contract, . . . (b)
any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these documents (except for
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the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to
the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds.
(R. 25, 312.)
7.

Section 14 of the REPC offered by the Wilsons on January 8, 2007,

provides as follows: "This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of
the parties.55 (R. 27,314.)
8.

Section 23 of the REPC provides as follows: "' Acceptance5 occurs when

Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a) signs the offer or
counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party
or to the other party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required.55
(R. 28, 315.)
9.

Along with the REPC the Wilsons included a seller financing addendum

("SFA l55) that specified that Johnson would provide seller financing for the Property. (R.
31-32,584.)
10.

Every addendum to the REPC, including SFA 1, contains the following

provision: "[ ] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until
on

[ ] AM [ ] PM Mountain Time

(Date), to accept the terms of this SELLER FINANCING

ADDENDUM in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so
accepted, the offer as set forth in this SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM shall lapse.55
(R. 309.)
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11.

SFA 1 provided, among other things, thkt $990,000.00 of the purchase

price would be financed by Johnson at a rate of 4.9% with monthly payments of
$5,250.00 per month beginning on May 1, 2007. SFA 1 (iad an offer expiration deadline
of 5:00 p.m. on January 8, 2007. (R. 103, 274, 308-09.)
12.

On or about January 8, 2007, Johnson executed a counteroffer, listed as

Addendum No. 2, agreeing to accept $1,200,000.00 for the purchase of the Properly and
"requiring a 72 hour time clause/option to keep the house q>n the market." (R. 585.)
13.

Addendum No. 2 specifically states:

to the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify! or conflict with any
provision of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers,
these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all
prior addenda and counteroffers, not modified by thip ADDENDUM
shall remain the same.
(R. 585.)
14.

Johnson's counteroffer made no mention of S^A 1, and made no changes to

any terms of the original offer, other than those noted in paragraph 12 above. (R. 585.)
15.

On that same date, the Wilsons executed Addendum No. 3, counter-

offering the following: (a) purchase price of $1,150,000; (p) in lieu of 72 hour clause,
settlement to be 2-23-07; (c) earnest money of $20,000 to be non-refundable and released
to seller on 2-10-07; and (d) all other terms and conditions to remain the same. (R. 585.)
16.

On the same date, Johnson signed both the REFjC and Addendum No. 3, but

did not sign SFA 1. (R. 585.)
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17.

Johnson never agreed to the terms contained in SFA 1 nor did she sign SFA

1. Neither Johnson nor her agent expressed to the Wilsons or their agent consent to SFA
1 or its terms. (R. 103, 274, 308-09.)
18.

Nearly one month after the REPC and Addendum No. 3 were signed by

Johnson, on February 8, 2007, Johnson received a second proposed Seller Financing
Addendum from the Wilsons ("SFA 2"). SFA 2 did not specify the amount of seller
financing but offered the same interest rate as SFA 1 and listed the monthly payment as
$5,250.00 per month. However, SFA 2 then specified the monthly payment amount as
"P&I $5493.02 per month. See amortization schedule for principle [sic] and interest
breakdown. Taxes: $228.07 per month. Insurance: $154.00 per month. 2 Months taxed
[sic] and insurance to be deposited in impound account." Again, the proposed terms were
not satisfactory to Johnson. Johnson never agreed to the terms contained in SFA 2 nor
did she sign SFA 2 or communicate acceptance of its terms to the Wilsons or their agent.
(R. 104, 322-23.)
19.

On or about February 10, 2007, Johnson received the $20,000 earnest

money deposit check and negotiated it. (R. 586.)
20.

The Settlement Deadline for the Wilsons' purchase of the Property was

February 23, 2007, pursuant to Addendum No. 3. (R. 104, 320.)
21.

On or about February 23, 2007, at approximately 12:00 p.m. Johnson hand-

delivered a proposed Seller Financing Addendum to the closing office, Atlas Title, on
terms acceptable to Johnson at the reduced purchase price of $1,150,000.00, for
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execution by the Wilsons ("SFA 3")- SFA 3 had an offer acceptance date of February 23,
2007 at 5:00 p.m. Johnson never received an executed cpopy of SFA 3 from the Wilsons
or their agent. (R. 104,325-26.)
22.

In spite of the changes in the ultimate pric^ from the Wilsons' initial offer

to the final agreement, the parties did not change the language of the REPC or SFA 1,
which stated that Johnson would finance $990,000 as the seller and that the Wilsons
would pay a total of $110,000 as a down payment. (R. 585.)
23.

By close of business on February 23, 2007, the date set for closing, the

Wilsons tendered a total of $118,625.42 (calculated as the earnest money deposit of
$20,000.00 delivered to Johnson on or before Februaiy 10, 2007, plus $98,625.42
delivered to the closing office on February 23, 2007) and a promissory note and trust
deed for seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000 00.

The HUD-1 Settlement

Statement which the Wilsons executed and delivered to the closing office provided for
seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000. (R. 334, 255456, 258.)
24.

None of the REPC, SFA 1, SFA 2, or SFA 3 brovide for seller financing in

the amount of $1,035,000.00. Neither Johnson nor her agent, Meri Crandall, agreed to or
communicated agreement to that amount of seller financing to the Wilsons, Mr. Larkin,
or the closing office. (R. 334, 274.)
25.

On February 23, 2007, Johnson went to the title company and signed most

of the closing documents, but did not sign the HUD-1 Settlement Statement showing
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seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000.00 and the transaction did not close. (R.
604.)
26.

At no time did Johnson or the Wilsons provide the closing office with a

document signed by all the parties which provides for seller financing in the amount of
$1,035,000.00. (R.255.)
27.

Following the settlement deadline of February 23, 2007, Wilsons withdrew

the sum of $98,625.42 from the closing office. (R. 256.)
28.

On February 26, 2007 (three days after the settlement deadline had

expired), the Wilsons caused a Notice of Interest in Real Property (the "NOP) to be
recorded against the Property in the official records of Washington County, Utah. (R.
328, 334.)
29.

Nowhere in the Wilsons' initial offer, any other documents signed by the

parties or even in the unexecuted SFA 1 and SFA 2 is there any reference nor did the
parties ever discuss or agree to seller financing of a specific percentage of the total
purchase price (90% or otherwise). (R. 103-04, 110-19, 123-26.)
30.

According to the custom and practice of the Utah residential real estate

industry, both parties to a standardized REPC must execute and accept an addendum to
the REPC in order for the terms of the addendum to be included in the purchase and sale
transaction.

This requirement of dual execution and mutual acceptance enables an

escrow officer and real estate agent to know which addenda represent the agreement of
the parties and are to be included in the closing. (R. 445, 448.)
9

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The District Court erred in ruling that SFA 1 was tending on Johnson since
Johnson did not accept SFA 1 in accordance with its stated terms. In order to accept SFA
1, thereby making it binding on both Johnson and the Wilsons, Johnson was required to
sign SFA 1 and communicate to the Wilsons that SFA 1 had been accepted. Johnson did
neither. By its own express terms, the Wilsons offer for seller financing, on the terms set
forth in SFA 1, lapsed when it was not accepted by Johnson.
Assuming SFA 1 was enforceable against Johnson, the Wilsons breached its
terms. SFA 1 provided for seller financing in the amount of $990,000.00. The Wilsons
never executed a promissory note or trust deed or other seller financing document in the
amount of $990,000.00. Instead, at closing, the Wilsons tendered seller financing
documents in the amount of $1,035,000.00 and insisted Johjnson close. Johnson never
agreed to seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000.00 and the Wilsons, not Johnson,
breached the terms of the REPC and SFA 1. The Wilsons' breach excused any further
performance from Johnson.
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ARGUMENT
L

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT SFA 1 WAS
BINDING ON JOHNSON SINCE IT WAS NEVER ACCEPTED BY
JOHNSON,
A.

Johnson Did Not Accept the Terms of SFA 1 as Required by Its Express
Terms.

In its Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment entered August 11, 2008, the
Court concluded that SFA 1, which was offered to Johnson by the Wilsons in conjunction
with the REPC, was binding upon Johnson even though she never signed SFA 1 nor
communicated her assent. (R. 586-87.) The Wilsons set a deadline for SFA 1 to be
accepted by 5:00 p.m. on January 8, 2007. (R. 309.) SFA 1 stated that it could only be
accepted by Johnson "in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC" and
that "[ujnless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse." (R.
309) (emphasis added). Section 23 of the REPC provides as follows:
"Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer
of the other: (a) signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate
acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other party's
agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required.
(R. 315) (emphasis added). At no time did Johnson sign SFA 1, nor did she or her agent
communicate to the Wilsons or their agent that SFA 1 had been signed or that Johnson
had accepted the terms of SFA 1. (R. 103, 274, 308-09.)
SFA 1 constituted an offer and the manner of acceptance of the offer was clearly
described by its express terms. "When an offer specifies the manner in which it must be
accepted, it can only be accepted in the specified manner. Otherwise mutual assent is
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lacking, and no contract is formed." Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. David
E. Ross II, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah App. 1993); see also Phelps v. Jean Smith Sanders
Trust, 1999 UT App 159, *2 ("[W]hen the terms of a contract provide for the method of
acceptance, acceptance can only be effectuated by compliance with the prescribed
method") (unpublished opinion).

Johnson failed TO sign SFA 1 or otherwise

communicate her acceptance of its terms to the Wilson^ or their agent by 5:00 p.m. on
January 8, 2007 (the offer acceptance deadline chosen by the Wilsons). Accordingly,
SFA 1 lapsed and did not become part of the REPC wh^n Johnson accepted Addendum
No. 3.
B.

The Wilsons' Conduct Demonstrates Thatl They Understood that SFA 1
Had Lapsed and That the Parties Had | Not Reached an Agreement
Regarding Seller Financing.

The Wilsons' conduct after the lapse of SFA 1 demonstrates that they understood
that SFA 1 had lapsed and was not part of the REPC. Onj February 8, 2007, the Wilsons
sent to Johnson a second Seller Financing Addendum, SFA 2, which did not specify the
amount of seller financing and which detailed a different (monthly payment amount than
SFA 1. (R. 104, 322-23.) Where SFA 1 simply stated thai payments would be $5,250.00
per month, SFA 2 stated "P&I $5493.02 per month.

See amortization schedule for

principle [sic] and interest breakdown. Taxes: $228.07 per month. Insurance: $154.00
per month. 2 Months taxed [sic] and insurance to be deposited in impound account." (R.
322.) Further, SFA 1 required the Wilsons to deliver the following to Johnson or the
closing office by the close of business on February 23, 200y: (a) a promissory note in the
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amount of $990,000.00 and (b) the sum of $160,000.00 (representing the difference
between the total purchase price and the portion of the purchase price to be seller
financed pursuant to the amounts set forth in SFA 1). (R. 308, 320.) The Wilsons did not
deliver the required funds and documents by February 23, 2007; instead they delivered
$118,625.42 ($20,000.00 in earnest money plus $98,625.42 at closing on February 23,
2007) and a promissory note in the amount of $1,035,000.00. (R. 334, 256, 586.) The
Wilsons' own conduct—which is entirely inconsistent with the stated terms of SFA 1—
demonstrates that SFA 1 was not agreed to by the parties and was not incorporated into
the REPC.
C.

Enforcement of SFA 1 Would Violate the Statute of Frauds and Fail to
Give Effect to the REPC's Provisions Regarding Amendment.

The REPC is within the Utah Statute of Frauds. "[A]n offer to purchase [real
estate] when accepted creates an interest in real estate and is within the statute of frauds."
Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 423-24 (Utah 1986). Section 25-5-1 of Utah Code
Annotated (Sections 25-5-1 et seq. referred to as the "Utah Statute of Frauds") provides
in relevant part:
No estate or interest in real property,. . . shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same.
Section 25-5-3 of Utah Code Annotated further provides in relevant part:

"Every

contract . . . for the sale, of any lands, or any interests in lands, shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
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whom the lease or sale is to be made." The Utah Supreme Court stated in Golden Key
Realty, Inc. v. PJ. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985) that "[t]he rule is well settled
in Utah that if an original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent
agreement which modifies the original written agreement must also satisfy the
requirements of the statute of frauds to be enforceable." Each addendum to the REPC,
including SFA 1, represents a subsequent agreement which modifies the REPC.
The express terms of the REPC are consistent w th the Utah Statute of Frauds.
Section 14 of the REPC states: "This Contract cannot be changed except by written
agreement of the parties." (R. 314.) As mentioned above, each addendum to the REPC
requires the offeree to accept the offer/addendum by signing the addendum and
transmitting her acceptance of the same to the offeror. The terms of the REPC cannot be
modified or added upon except through a subsequent written agreement signed by the
parties.
In Williams, the seller under a real estate purchasb contract failed to accept an
offer to purchase property owned by her and her husband as joint tenants by the offer
acceptance deadline set by the buyer. The seller later attempted to ratify her husband's
timely acceptance of the offer. The Utah Supreme Court held that the seller's attempt to
accept the offer (or ratify her husband's prior acceptance) after the offer had lapsed was
ineffectual.

Id. at 424. The Court stated that the sel er's theory of "open-ended

ratification .. . would play havoc with the laws of offer and Acceptance." Id,
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Likewise, the Wilsons' argument, and the District Court's ruling, that a party to a
real estate purchase contract can be bound to the terms of an addendum which she has not
signed in accordance with the terms of the addendum would "play havoc" with the laws
of offer and acceptance in the context of residential real estate purchases. Under the
Wilsons' theory of the law, parties to a residential real estate purchase contract, their
agents, and closing offices would be uncertain as to which addenda were binding and
which were not. While the Wilsons' position would lead to chaos, the express terms of
the REPC and addenda and relevant Utah statutory and case law lend themselves to
clarity, consistency, and the mutual assent of the parties.
Finally, "[a] court must attempt to construe the contract so as to 'harmonize and
give effect to all of [its] provisions.'" Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ^f
30, 84 P.3d 1134 (citations omitted). To adopt the Wilsons' position and affirm the
District Court's ruling would be to render superfluous the provisions in each addendum
which require acceptance by a certain deadline and in accordance with the "acceptance"
provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. It would also render superfluous Section 14 of the
REPC, requiring amendments to be in writing. Finally, it would render the acceptance,
rejection, and counter-offer provision and signature block on each addendum superfluous,
since the offeree could be bound by the terms of the addendum without ever signing it.
In sum, the District Court erred in finding that SFA 1 was binding on Johnson.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE WILSONS
DID NOT BREACH THE REPC SINCE THE WILSONS FAILED TO
EXECUTE DOCUMENTS OR PROVIDE JHE CONSIDERATION
REQUIRED BY SFA 1.
A.

The Wilsons Breached the REPC and jSFA 1 By Failing to Execute a
Promissory Note and Trust Deed in the Amount of $990,000.00

Johnson did not breach the terms of the REPC when she refused to sign the HUD1 Settlement Statement on February 23, 2007. The REPC provided for seller financing in
the amount for $990,000.00. (R. 585.) Likewise, SFA 1 which the District Court found
to be binding on Johnson even though she did not sign it or deliver it to Wilsons, clearly
stated that the amount for seller financing was $990,000.00. (R. 585.) The Wilsons have
not produced any document signed by the parties which states a different amount of seller
financing or any other agreement executed by Johnson recognizing a different amount of
seller financing. Therefore, the REPC and SFA 1, assuming it was binding on the parties,
required the Wilsons, as buyers, to tender a promissory nob and trust deed in the amount
of $990,000.00 and cash in the amount of $140,000.00 (Calculated as the total purchase
price of $1,150,000.00 less Earnest Money Deposit of $20j000.00, less seller financing in
the amount of $990,000.00) to Johnson or the closing office by close of business on
February 23, 2007. Instead, the Wilsons tendered $98 625.42 in cash along with a
promissory note and trust deed in the amount of $1,035,000.00. (R. 586.) Johnson never
agreed to seller financing in this amount. It is the Wilsons who breached the terms of the
REPC and SFA 1, not Johnson.
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The Utah Supreme Court in Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411,414
(Utah 1998) stated the well established rule that:
When one party to a valid contract commits an 'uncured material failure' in
its performance of the contract, the non-failing party is relieved of its duty
to continue to perform under the contract. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, § 237 (1981). This general rule is based on the principle that
where performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of promises,
each party is entitled to the assurance that he will not be called upon to
perform his remaining duties of performance with respect to the expected
exchange if there has already been an uncured material failure of
performance by the other party.
Likewise, in Jackson v. Rich, 499 P.2d 279, 280-81 (Utah 1972), the Utah
Supreme Court concluded that:
The law regarding the rights under a contract of one who first breaches it is
set out in 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts § 365, as follows: As a rule, a party first
guilty of a substantial or material breach of contract cannot complain if the
other party thereafter refuses to perform. He can neither insist on
performance by the other party nor maintain an action against the other
party for a subsequent failure to perform. . . . It has also been said that
where a contract is not performed, the party who is guilty of the first breach
is generally the one upon whom rests all the liability for the
nonperformance.
The Wilsons' failure to tender the agreed upon amount of cash and a promissory note for
the required amount of seller financing constituted a material breach or failure to perform
under the REPC and excused Johnson from further performance.
B.

The REPC and SFA 1 Do Not Provide for Ninety Percent Seller
Financing.

The Wilsons argued below, and the District Court impliedly found, that the
Wilsons did not breach the REPC and SFA because the REPC and SFA 1 were intended
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to provide that Johnson seller finance ninety percent (90°/jo) of the purchase price of the
Property. (R. 552—53, 586-87.) The only evidence that the Wilsons offered in support of
this contention was Scott Wilson's unexpressed intent. (R. 356.) Johnson disputed that
she ever had this intent and the Wilsons themselves do not contend that they ever even
spoke with Johnson regarding this version of the REPC and SFA 1. There is no
document agreed to by Johnson or even prepared by Wilsons expressing this intent. The
REPC and SFA 1 are clear on their face—Johnson is to provide seller financing in the
amount of $990,000.00. The District Court's wholesale rewrite of the REPC and SFA 1
is inconsistent with the statute of frauds and should be reversed. Johnson did not breach
the terms of the REPC or SFA 1. Rather the Wilsons did ip failing to tender the proper
amounts.
At its core, the Wilsons' contention is that the $50,d00.00 gap between the
purchase price initially offered by the Wilsons ($1,100,000.00) and the purchase price
ultimately agreed to ($1,150,000.00), which is not addressed in any of the documentation
surrounding this transaction, should be absorbed by Johnson as part of "seller financing."
This contention, which was accepted by the District Court, is inconsistent with the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980). In Reed, the
Utah Supreme Court, while interpreting a contract for the purchase of real property for
$70,000.00 upon "terms to be arranged," stated that "[w]here there is no agreement
concerning the terms of payment this Court will alleviate the uncertainty of this aspect of
the contract by requiring full payment at the time of the tenqer of the conveyance." Id. at
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1378-79 (emphasis added). This principle has subsequently been relied on and applied
by the Utah Court of Appeals: "More troubling is the lack of any detail concerning the
seller financing in the agreement. However, such uncertainty does not invalidate a
contract. Rather, a requirement of full cash payment at closing will be implied" Dunn v.
Prichard, 2001 UT App 252, *1 n.l (citing Reed, 610 P.2d at 1378-79) (emphasis added)
(unpublished opinion).
In this case, again assuming that SFA 1 is enforceable even though it was never
"accepted" by Johnson according to SFA 1's own terms, the principles articulated in
Reed and Dunn, as well as the structure of the REPC1, require the uncertainty regarding
the allocation of the additional $50,000 to be resolved in Johnson's favor by requiring the
Wilsons to pay $140,000 in cash at closing (calculated as the total purchase price of
$1,150,000.00 less Earnest Money Deposit of $20,000.00, less seller financing in the
amount of $990,000.00). The Wilsons only paid $98,625.42 in cash at closing. (R. 586.)
Consequently, the Wilsons failed to tender the required cash payment of $140,000 at
closing and thereby materially breached the REPC. This material breach excused any
1

Paragraph 2 of the REPC, which sets forth the purchase price for the subject property,
specifies the terms of payment in paragraph 2.1 by subtracting each type of payment from
the total purchase price. (R. 24, 311.) Therefore, from the total purchase price of
$1,150,000, the REPC first subtracts any earnest money paid. (R. 24, 311.) Then, the
REPC subtracts any amounts provided by a new loan, the buyer's assumption of an
existing loan, seller financing, and/or any "other" payment. (R. 24, 311.) Finally, after
all other methods of payment have been allocated, the "Balance of Purchase Price [is
due] in Cash at Settlement." (R. 24, 311.) This structure of the REPC supports the
principle stated in Reed and Dunn because all amounts required for full payment of the
purchase price not otherwise provided for in the REPC are due in cash at the time of
closing.
19

obligation Johnson had to convey the Property or to render any further performance
under the REPC.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the District Court's entrt ot summary judgment in favor
of the Wilsons because it erred in concluding that (i) SFA 1 was binding on Johnson even
though she never signed it in the manner specified by the REPC for it to be accepted and
(ii) the Wilsons did not breach the REPC and SFA 1 whenthey failed to tender a
promissory note and trust deed for seller financing in the amounts specified in SFA 1.
DATED this 16th day of October, 2009.

BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE

AA
Andrew V. Collins
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

(j^ day of October, 2009,1 caused two (2) true and

correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be served via U.S. Mail,
first-class postage prepaid, on the following:
Michael F. Leavitt
Durham Jones & Pinegar
192 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84770

a^)/C{j^^f
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LEXSTATUC A 25-5-1
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2009 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
* STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2009 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION. *
* ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2009 UT 38 (06/19/200*); 2009 UT App 162 (06/18/2009) *
* AND JUNE 1, 2009 (FEDERAL CA^ES) *
TITLE 25. FRAUD
CHAPTER 5. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (2009)
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over
or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created],, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
HISTORY: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1974, 2461; C.L. 1917, §§ 4874, 5811; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-5-1.
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LEXSTAT UCA 25-5-3
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2009 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
* STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2009 FIRSt SPECIAL SESSION. *
* ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2009 UT 38 (06/19/20W); 2009 UT App 162 (06/18/2009) *
* AND JUNE 1, 2009 (FEDERAL CA^ES) *
TITLE 25. FRAUD
CHAPTER 5. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (2009
§ 25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands,
shall be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom
the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
HISTORY: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2463; C.L. 1917, § 5813; R.S. 1933 ty C. 1943, 33-5-3.
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^LexisNexis*
LEXSEE 1999UTAPP 159
Daniel J. Phelps, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-appellaiu, v. Jean Smith Sanders
Trust, Defendant, Appellant, and Crossjappellee.
Case No. 971575-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
1999 UT App 159; 1999 Utah App. LE^IS 292

May 13,1999, Filed
NOTICE:
CATION

[*1]

NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLI-

PRIOR HISTORY:
Second District, Farmington
Department. The Honorable Jon M. Memmott
DISPOSITION:

must in turn be accepted by the original offeror in order
to create a contract."). Therefore, the issue is whether
Phelps accepted Sanders's counteroffer by initialing the
contract. Whether a contract [*2] exists is question of
law that we review for correctness. See Hughes & Sons
Quintek, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Affirmed and remanded.

COUNSEL: Craig S. Cook and George B. Handy, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
Douglas M. Durbano and Stanley L. Ballif, Layton, for
Appellee
JUDGES: Pamela T. Greenwood, Associate Presiding
Judge. WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Judge, Norman H. Jackson, Judge
OPINION BY: Pamela T. Greenwood
OPINION
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Jackson.
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge:
ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTEROFFER
Both parties agree that at the June 26, 1995, meeting the
time for acceptance of plaintiffs offer had lapsed, resulting in Sanders's signature on the contract becoming a
counteroffer. See Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180,
185, 487 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1971) ("An offeror who
receives an acceptance which is too late or which is otherwise defective, cannot at his election regard it as valid.
The late or defective acceptance is a counter-offer which

Sanders correctly argues that when the terms of a contract provide for the method of acceptance, acceptance
can only be effectuated by compliance with the prescribed method. SeeCrane v. Timberbrook Village, Ltd.,
714 P.2d 3, 4 (btah Ct. App. 1989) ("In making an offer,
the offeror may specify the manner in which the offer
must be accepted. If the offer is not accepted in the specified manner, mutual assent is lacking and no contract is
formed."). In this case, the contract required the parties
to the contract to "sign the offer or counter offer where
noted to indicate acceptance." (Emphasis added.) The
contract also included a signature line at the bottom of
the document. Therefore, we must determine whether
initialing the contract constituted a signature for purposes
of accepting the counteroffer.
In Jaffe v. Gibbons, 290 S.C. 468, 351 S.E.2d 343 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1986), the court addressed the question of
whether initialing a contract for the sale of real estate
was tantamount to an acceptance of [*3] a counteroffer
when the contract required a signature for acceptance.
See id. at 346. In holding that there was a meeting of the
minds such that a valid contract was formed, the court
noted that generally when two parties to a transaction
both sign a document, that document becomes a valid,
enforceable contract. See id. at 345. Under circumstances
similar to this case, the court held that "when [the buyer]
initialed the [changes to the contract], he accepted the
counter offer, thereby creating a binding contract." Id. at
346. Furthermore, the court held that although the buyer
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"only initialed and did not sign his full name to the deletions; the initials, in our opinion, amount to both a signing and an acceptance by Jaffe of the counter offer." Id;
see also 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 188 (1991) (initialing a contract is as effective in binding a party thereto as a full signature.)
In this case, the trial court found, and neither party disputes, that each party understood the terms of the contract and intended to enter into a binding contract.
Therefore, we conclude that Phelps's signature via his
initials on the contract [*4] constituted a valid acceptance of Sanders's counteroffer. l
1 We find no merit in Sanders's argument that
Phelps's signature was not placed in the correct
location and thus rendered the contract invalid.
See PIO v. John B. Gilliland Constr., Inc. 276
Ore. 975, 560 P.2d 247, 250 (Ore. 1976) (holding
signature placed anywhere on a contract is sufficient to authenticate it).
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Utah's statute of frauds provides that all interests in real
property "shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered
or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or
by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring
the same." Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1998); see also
Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 33
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (" a document to be enforceable
under the statute of frauds must be subscribed by the
party granting the conveyance"' (emphasis added)(quoting [*5] Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421,
424 (Utah 1986))), petition for cert, filed, 231 Utah Adv.
Rep. 24 (Utah 1994).
The contract at issue is clearly a sufficient writing memorializing the parties' intent to convey real property.
Furthermore, the contract is signed by Sanders - the

party conveying the land and the party against whom
enforcement is sought; therefore, the contract in this case
satisfies the statute of frauds.
ATTOFNF.Y FEES
Phelps argues the trial court erred in refusing to award
him attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party under
the contract. However, Phelps did not raise the issue of
attorney fees under the contract either in his complaint or
motion for summary judgment and thus waived his right
to attorney fees below. See Lee v. Barnes, 977 P.2d 550,
1999 UT App 126, 367 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 41 (Utah Ct.
App. 1999) (holding party waived right to attorney fees
because "attorney fees were never mentioned at oral argument" and party failed "to properly address the issue to
the trial courtf'). Nevertheless, Phelps is entitled to reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal, and we remand
to the trial court for a determination [*6] and award of
these fees.
|
Finally, Pnelps argues that he should be awarded attorney fees under section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code
because Sanders's defense was in bad faith. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1996 & Supp. 1998). We disagree. Trial courts are accorded broad discretion in awarding attorney fees based on an opposing party's bad faith.
See Valcarcelv. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah
1997). Because Sanders has failed to show the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to award attorney fees to
Phelps under section 78-27-56, we affirm the trial court's
denial of attorney fees on this basis.
Affirmed and remanded.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Associate Presiding Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W Bench, Judge
Norman H Jackson, Judge
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^LexisNexis*
LEXSEE2001UTAPP252
Douglas W. Dunn and Ruth E. Dunn, husband and wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
Agnes Prichard; Seven Prichard; Jean S. Kump aka Wanda Jean Kump, trustee of
the Jean S. Kump Trust; and Delbert Keith Kump and Jodi Sue Dembowski, personal representatives of the Shirl R. Kump Estate, Defendants and Appellees.
Case No. 20000823-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UT^H
2001 UT App 252; 2001 Utah App. LEklS 412

August 30, 2001, Filed
NOTICE:
CATION

[*1]

NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLI-

PRIOR HISTORY:
Eighth District, Vernal Department. The Honorable John R. Anderson
DISPOSITION:
and remanded.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part

COUNSEL: Daniel S. Sam, Vernal, for Appellants
Clark B. Allred and Clark A. McClellan, Vernal, for
Appellees
JUDGES: Gregory K. Orme, Judge. WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge, William
A. Thorne, Jr., Judge
OPINION BY: Gregory K. Orme
OPINION
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Thorne.
ORME, Judge:
The lack of earnest money, omission of a closing date,
and identification of other terms as "N.A." do not render
the contract unenforceable in this case, for essentially the
reasons argued by appellants. ' Therefore, the trial court
erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment. However, it does not follow that appellants are
entitled to summary judgment.

1 Mjore troubling is the lack of any detail concerning the seller financing called for in the
agreement. However, such uncertainty does not
invalidate a contract. Rather, a requirement of full
cash payment at closing will be implied. See Reed
v. Alvdv, 610 P.2d 1374, 1378-79 (Utah 1980).
[*2] In their motion for summary judgment, appellees contended that appellants led them to believe that
what they signed was merely a preliminary document
appellants could use to help determine if financing could
be obtained and was not intended to be a binding contract for the sale of real estate. Appellants challenge this
contention factually, but also argue that extrinsic evidence regarding the intention of the parties and their
discussions leading up to the signing of the document is
not admissibly to vary the terms of an integrated contract.
While thfe precept is generally true, Utah courts
have long held that "parole evidence is admissible to
show the circumstances under which the contract was
made or the (purpose for which the writing was executed." Unio\i Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665
(Utah 1985). See •also Berkeley Bank for Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P.2d| 798, 801 (Utah 1980)(indicating parole
evidence was properly admitted to show that signed
notes were represented as being "just a formality" in obtabling loans and not intended by defendants to be contracts); Bybee Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118, 122
(Utah 1948) [J 3] (explaining parole evidence is admissible to show that what appears to be a warranty deed
was actually given ionlv for security purposes).
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Particularly insightful is the case of Union Bank v.
Swenson, where a unanimous Utah Supreme Court held
that allegations, such as those made by the appellees in
this case, "raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the parties assented to the writing as a final
statement of the intended agreement or executed it for
some other purpose." 707 P.2d at 666. The Union Bank
Court further explained that "parole evidence, indeed any
relevant evidence, is admissible" to assist a court in determining whether a writing was intended by the parties
to be a fully integrated agreement. Id. at 665.
Thus, appellees' contention in this regard is not foreclosed as a matter of law. The relevant material facts

are in dispute however, meaning the claim cannot be
resolved on (summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). Accordin gly, we affirm the trial court's denial of
appellants' sijmmary judgment motion, reverse the trial
court's grant of appellees' summary judgment motion,
and remand for trial or such other [*4] proceedings as
may now be £ppropriate.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge
William A. Thorne, Jr., Judge

Addendum E

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
This is a legally binding contract Utah law requires real estate licensees to use this form, Buyer and Seller, however, may agree to alter or
delete its provisions or to use a different form. If you desire legal or tax advice consult your attorney or tax advisor.

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT
offers
Buyer S m t t & T i f f a n y W i l s o n .
J
oners to
to purchase
purchase the
the Property
Prop
described below and hereoy delivers to the Brokerage, as Earnest Money, the ;amount of S 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 in the form of
Check
which, upon Acceptance of this offer by all parties (as defined in Section 23),
shall be deposited in accordance with state law.
Received by:

-(Date)

on
(Signature of agent/broker acknowledges receipt of Earnest Money)

Brokerage: F x i t R e d R o c k R e a l t y

Phone Number 4 3 5 - 9 8 6 - 0 2 2 0
OFFER TO PURCHASE

1.

PROPERTY:

7Qd 3 ANASAZI Circ?e Washincton. UT 3^780

also described as: Indian Oaks Subdivision Lot #24

city of Washington

t

County of W a s h i n g t o n

, State of Utah, Zip 8 4 7 R 0

(the "Property").

1,1 Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following items if presently owned and attached to
the Property: plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater; built-in appliances; light
fixtures and bulbs; bathroom fixtures; curtains, draperies and rods; window and" door screens; storm doors and windows;
window blinds; awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system permanently affixed carpets; automatic
garage door opener and accompanying transmitter(s); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The following items shall also be
included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as^ to title:
All items outlined ?n MLS profile. !o a(sc include aU fixtures. built-in cabir.ctfr'entef.ginnneot ce^iere. electronic A recreational eQuiomelnt on premtsis 3( stfer cate 'Jha\ r^av or may noi De in :he MLS profile.

1.2 Excluded Items, The following items are excluded from this sale: _
AH r e m o v a h l e f u r n i t u r e s t i c h a s h e r i s , l i n e n s , f l a t w a r e tatytes
1,3 Water Rights. The following water rights are included in this sale.

& chairs

NA
2,

PURCHASE PRICE The Purchase Price for the Property is $ 1 . 1 0 0 . 0 0 ( 8 . 0 0
2.1 Method of Payment The Purchase Price will be paid as follows:
$
70,000 00
( a ) Earnest Money Deposit. Under certain conditions described in this Contract, THIS
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE.
$__
(b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a new loan i s provided in Section 2.3. Buyer will apply
for one or more of the following loans: [ ] CONVENTIONAL [ ] FHA [ ] VA
[ ] OTHER (specify)
If an FHAA/A loan applies, see attached FHAA/A Loan Addendum
If the loan is to include any particular terms, then check below and give details:
[ ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS

s
s

990.000.00

s

90 000 00

S

s i 10000000

(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

Loan Assumption Addendum (See attached Assumption Addendum if applicable)
Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Aqdendum if applicable)
Other (specify)
Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Settlement

PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through (f)

2,2 Financing Condition, (check applicable box)
(a)
[ ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioner]! upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable
loan(s) referenced in Section 2.1(b) or (c) (the "Loan"). This condition is referred to as the "Financing Condition."
(b)
[ x ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan.
Section 2.3 does not apply.
|
>
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Seller's Initials

Date

Buyer's I n i t i a l s S ) / - ^ '

Date

l/fc/dl

~7

2.3 Application for Loan,
(a) Buyer's duties. No later than the Loan Application & Fee Deadline referenced in Section 24(a) Buyer shall
apply for the Loan "Loan Application" occurs only when Buyer has (i) completed, signed, and delivered to the lender (the
'Lender") the initial loan application and documentation required by the Lender and (a) paid all loan application fees as
required by the Lender Buyer agrees to diligently work to obtain the Loan Buyer will promptly provide the Lender with any
additional documentation as required by the Lender
j
(b) Procedure if Loan Application is denied If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Lender
does not approve the Loan (a "Notice of Loan Denial"), Buyer shall, no later than three calendar days thereafter, provide a
copy to Seller Buyer or Seller may. within three calendar days after Seller's receipt of such notice cancel this Contract by
providing written notice to the other party in the event of a cancellation under this Section 2 3(b) (i) if the Notice of Loan
Denial was received by Buyer no later than the Loan Denial Deadline referenced in Section 24(d), the Earnest Money
Deposit shall be returned to Buyer, (ii) if the Notice of Loan Denial was rece ved by Buyer after that date, the Earnest
Money Deposit shall be released to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept as Sejler's exclusive remedy the Earnest Money
Deposit as liquidated damages A failure to cancel as provided in this Section 2 3(b) shall have no effect on the Financing
Condition set forth in Section 2 2(a) Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section of this Contract shall be
governed by such other provisions
I
2.4 Appraisal Condition. Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon the Property
appraising for not less than the Purchase Price This condition is referred to as\ the "Appraisal Condition" If the Appraisal
Condition applies and the Buyer receives wntten notice from the Lender that the Property as appraised for less than the
Purchase Price (a "Notice of Appraised Value"), Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing a copy of such written notice
to Seller no later than three days after Buyer's receipt of such written notice In the event of a cancellation under this
Section 2 4 (i) if the Notice of Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later than the Appraisal Deadline referenced in
Section 24(e), the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer, (n) if the Notice of Appraised Value was received by
Buyer after that date, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Sellef, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's
exclusive remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages. A failure to cancel as provided in this Section 2 4
shall be deemed a waiver of the Appraisal Condition by Buyer Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section
of this Contract shall be governed by such other provisions
3.

SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING.

Settlement shall take place on the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section Z4(f), or on a date upon which Buyer and
Seller agree in writing "Settlement" shall occur only when all of the following Have been completed (a) Buyer and Seller
have signed and delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents required by this Contract, by the
Lender, by written escrow instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies Required to be paid by Buyer under these
documents (except for the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by "
' to Seller or to the escrow/closing office
in the form of collected or cleared funds, and (c) any monies required to be
by Seller under these documents have
been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds Seller and Buyer
shall each pay one-half (YT) of the fee charged by the escrow/closing offici for its services in the settlement/closing
process Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated at
Settlement as set forth in this Section. Tenant deposits (including, but not limbed" to, security deposits, cleaning deposits
and prepaid rents) shall be paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at Settlement, Prorations set forth in this Section shall be
made as of the Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(f). unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties
Such writing could include the settlement statement. The transaction will be considered' closed when Settlement has been
completed, and when all of the following have been completed: (i) the proceeds of any new loan have been delivered by
the Lender to Seller or to the escrow/closing office; and (ii) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded in the
office of the county recorder. The actions described in parts (i) and (ii) of the preceding sentence shall be completed within
four calendar days of Settlement
4. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within [ j
[ ] Other (specify)
5.
[

hours [ ] J

days after Closing;

CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract
] Seller's Initials P ^ B u y e r ' s Initials

The Listing Agent, M F f f l

, represents [X] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer
as a Limited
The Listing Broker, C O L D W E L L BANKER PREMIER . represents Jx] Se|ler { ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer
as a Limited
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and Seller
Agent;
and Seller
Agent;

x

The Selling Agent, J E R E M Y

LARK1N

The Selling Broker. E X I T R E D R O C K R E A L T Y

represents [ ] Seile r [X] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent;
. represents [ ] Sel er [X] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent

6. TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement, Seller agrees to pay for a standard (coverage owner's policy of title insurance
insuring Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price. Any additional title insuranc^ coverage shall be at Buyer's expense
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b), Seller shall provide
to Buyer the following documents which are collectively referred to as the "Seller Disclosures"
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller;
(b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance;
(c) a copy of any leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing;
(d) written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or
zoning code violations; and
(e) Other (specify)

8, BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS Buyer's obligation to purchase
under this Contract (check applicable boxes):
(a) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in
Section 7;
(b) [ X ] I S [ 1 IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property;
(c) [ ] I S 1X1 IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the Property
' f by a licensed surveyor ("Survey");
(d) [ X ] I S [ 1 IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the cost, terms an availability of homeowner's insurance
coverage for the Property;
(e) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following tests and evaluations of the Property: (specify)

Professional Home & Termite Inspection

Mn
If any of the above items are checked in the affirmative,
then Sections 8.1, 8.2 8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they do not
apply. The items checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred to afe the "Evaluations & Inspections." Unless
otherwise provided in this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections shall be
for by Buyer and shall be conducted by
individuals or entities of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations
'""'"
& Inspections and with the walkthrough inspection under Section 11.
8.1 Evaluations & Inspections Deadline. No later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in Section
24(c) Buyer shall: (a) complete all Evaluations & Inspections; and (b) determine if the Evaluations & Inspections are
acceptable to Buyer.
8.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & Inspections are unacceptable, Buyer may,
no later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract
ntract by providing written notice to Seller,
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Seller with written notice of objections.
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Evaluations & Inspections
is Deadline, Buyer does not: (a) cancel
this Contract as provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to»Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspections,
the Evaluations & inspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer.
8.4 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period") in whi^h to agree in writing upon the manner of
resolving Buyer's objections. Except as provided in Section 10.2, Seller may bU shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's
objections, if Buyer and Seller have not agreed in writing upon the manner o^ resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer may
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar
iar days after expiration of the Response
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer. If
Contract is not canceled by Buyer under
this Section 8 4, Buyer's objections shall be deemed waived by Buyer. This waiter- shall not affect those items warranted in
Section 10.
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. There [X] ARE [ ] ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms If there are
the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference: [ J Addendum No 1
[X ] Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum [ ] Lead-Based Paint
^A D — « ^ r>~:_«.
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some transactions this disclosure te
is rpemirpH
required hu
by io™a
law) r[ ]i iLead-Based
Paint
L j
Addendum
(in
some
transactions
this
addendum
is
required
by
law)
[
x
]
Other
(specify)

Notice Of Interest Addendum
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10. SELLER WARRANTIES & REPRESENTATIONS.
10.1
Condition of Title. Seller represents that Seller has fee title tb the Property and will convey good and
marketable title to Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer agreejs, however, to accept title to the Property
subject to the following matters of record, easements, deed restrictions. CG&R's (meaning covenants, conditions and
restrictions), and rights-of-way; and subject to the contents of the Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer
under Section 8. Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Property and not expiring
prior to Closing. Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association dues, utilities, and other
services provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any loan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2. Kc).
Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax liens and warrants
3nts
Seller will cause to be paid current by Closing all assessments and homeowners association dues.
10.2
Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property will bq in the following condition ON THE DATE
SELLER DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER:
(a) the Property shall be broom-clean and free of debris and personal beloihgings Any Seller or tenant moving-related
damage to the Property shall be repaired at Seller's expense;
(b) the heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sprinkler systems and fixtures, and the appliances and fireplaces will
be in working order and fit for their intended purposes;
(c) the roof and foundation shall be free of leaks known to Seller;
(d) any private well or septic tank serving the Property shall have applicabl^ permits, and shall be in working order and
fit. for its intended purpose; and
(e) the Property and improvements, including the landscaping, will be in tf^ie same general condition as they were on
the date of Acceptance.
10.3
Home Warranty Plan. The "Home Warranty Plan" referenced I in this Section 10.3 is separate from the
warranties provided by Seller under Sections 10.1 and 10,2 above. (Check applicable boxes): A one-year Home
Warranty Plan [X] WILL [ ] WILL NOT be included in this transaction. If included, the Home Warranty Plan shall be
ordered by [X] Buyer [ ] Seller and shall be issued by a company selected by [X] Buyer [ ] Seller. The cost of the Home
Warranty Plan shall not exceed $450.00 and shall be paid for at Settlement byf [f ] Buyer [X] Seller.
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable time,
conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is "as represented," meaning that
the items referenced in Sections 1.1, 8.4 and 10.2 ("the items") are respectivelyjf present, repaired/changed as agreed, and
in the warranted condition. If the items are not as represented, Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace, correct or repair the
items or, with the consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount' at Settlement to provide for the same.
The failure to conduct a walk-through inspection, or to claim that an item is not $s represented, shall not constitute a waiver
by Buyer of the right to receive, on the date of possession, the items as represented
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none of
the following shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer: (a) no chandes in any existing leases shall be made; (b)
no new leases shall be entered into; (c) no substantial alterations or improy ements to the Property shall be made or
undertaken; and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be rfiade.
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership>, trust, estate, limited liability company, or
other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or h$r authority to do so and to bind Buyer and
Seller.
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures,
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations,
representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties, this Contract cannot be changed except by
written agreement of the parties.
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract
(check applicable box)
[X] SHALL
[ ] MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES
first be submitted to mediation. If the parties agree to mediation, the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a
mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to tiear its own costs of mediation. If mediation
fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this Contract shall apply Nothing in this Section 15 shall prohibit
any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest IVJIoney Deposit as liquidated damages, or to
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return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. It Seller defaults, in
addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies
to
Buyer upon
available at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agrees t opay
— the
'u~ liquidated
r.~..:^^ damages
^
»~ o
not
a default and is governed by Section
demand. It is agreed that denial of a Loan Application made by the Buyer is
2.3(b).
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorneyj fees shall not be awarded for participation
in mediation under Section 15
18. NOTICES. Except as provided in Section 23, all notices required under this Contract must be" (a) in writing; (b) signed
by "the party giving notice; and (c) received by the other party or the other party's agent no later than the applicable date
referenced in this Contract.
19. ABROGATION. Except for the provisions of Sections 10.1. 10 2, 15 and 17 and express warranties made in this
Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing.
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss to the Property, including physical darrpage or destruction to the Property or its
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking in eminent domain, shall be
borne by Seller until the transaction is closed.
2 1 . TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contract. Extensions must be
agreed to in writing by all parties. Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this Contract (a) performance under each Section
of this Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5:00 PMJMountain Time on the stated date; and (b)
the term "days" shall mean calendar days and shall, be counted beginning on th4 day following the event which triggers the
timing requirement (i.e., Acceptance, Notice of Loan Denial, etc.). Performance <|ates and times referenced herein shall not
be binding upon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties toi this Contract, except as otherwise agreed to
in writing by such non-party.
22. F A X TRANSMISSION A N D COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original. This
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts.
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding tcj an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a)
signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other
party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required.
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract:
(a) L o a n A p p l i c a t i o n & Fee Deadline

NA

(b) Seller Disclosure Deadline

3 Business Days after Acceptance

(c) Evaluations & Inspections Deadline

F p h m a r y Q t h . ?D07

(Date)

(Date)

.NA.

(d) Loan Denial Deadline

(Date)

(e) A p p r a i s a l Deadline

February 9th. ?f)07

(f)

On or before March 9th bQD7

Settlement Deadline

(Date)

(Date)

(Date)

25 OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions If
Seller does not accept this offer by: 5 : 0 0 . t ] A M [ x ] PM Mountain Time on J f g n n a r y 8 t h , ? 0 0 7
(Date),
tbis-qffer shalllapse; and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money Deposit io Buyer

Hfl/UA S\
( g t f f e / s Signature)
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(Offer Date)

Seller's Initials

(Buyer's Signature);' j "

Date

1/k

Buyer's Init a l s ^ / g f f i l /

hb-0

(Offer Date)

Date (///?/fi

/

I I le iat: '•!" >f the a I JOVC Offer Dates shall be referred to as the "Offer Reference Date"

StQlfj

T/FftftiV k/iL9D^

I'll Piu%kndccJ7f Sh&erfGs. UT
(Notice Address)

(Buyers Names) (PLEASE PRINT)

^770

(Zip Code)

(Phone)

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHECK ONE:
[ ] A C C E P T A N C E OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified
above.,.
[

] "

' = N r E K O F F E R : Seller presents foi Buyei "s Acceptance the teifu', wf Kuy*;j\, uf!«i -;iitipu I tn tht- f»t cptiufr. of
:u itujns as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO.
.

(Date)

(Seller's Signature)

(Seller's Signature)

(Time)

(Notice Address)

(Sellers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT)
[

(Date) (Time)

(Zip Code)

(Phone)

] RE IECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer.

(Date)

(Seller's Signature)

(Time)

(Seller's Signature)

(Date) (Time)

DOCUMENT i.t O H - T
State law requires Bi oket to i ur nisi i Buyer and Seller wit! » copt r . •. 1 '»•: ntract bearing all signatures. (Fill in applicable
section below.)
A . . ! a c k n o w l e d g e receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Cont]

MZ

/.

/AM
'(Date)

(fintr)

(Seller's Signature)

(Date)

(Seller's Signaturi)

(Date)

B. I pei sonally caus^u a it,,at copy w. iNe i ^ u y u n . ^ . J H . J U I„ , . < .*.. . l ! o
delivered on
(Date), postage (MOJ -H! ti.*h(-»(
Sent/Defivered by (specify)
_____
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.'
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Addendum F

vw/' vvf4vv?/*Ai v / j . u r«i

cxiw .^a BOCK r e a l t y

*AAflu.<\w

or^t ;j/,«i<:

SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THfSSBJLERFlNANCWGADDW^
Offer Rrtxvw Pate of January 6th, 2(107
. t»tw**n Scott & T|ffony Wifann
***fW>™*r^flflglftKJphngQn,,
\.
t _
asSeller, rraarxfiog
119 Property locate at, 7 0 4 8 AlSf A.SA7) Olmte Washinpfrm I /T 84f7flft
T*« toi^nnhi* ADDENDUM
are hereby trctftporsted ee part of the REPC.
L CREDIT D0CUMBMT5. Mhfc extension of oredfttoBuy®- shall he evidenced by* [fcj Mote and £>e*d of Trust
t INafa^dAfMndudY8DeedofTrustJ JOttec.^,
i_,.
2. CFlHttTTEKMS. ThMerrosofthewgditfooumentsni^
jSSQiPflQ-M
. principal amount'of the note (the "Note');tatar**{atfl.9
% per annum; payable aiapprcadmately
l625yJEL—p^OlQIim
> T** «nt!rs unpaid btiAnod of pdnclptf ptus accrued interestfedue In 3 a Q _ month©
fromdgte of the Note, First payment due M q y J fit 2nf)7
Additional principal payments, bafloon payments or other
torroe oe follows:.

*+~

The crecffi documentsrefertwicedin 3ecion 1 of this ADDENDUM wlU contain • dyk-on-wto clause In fever gf Seller, Sailer
agreestoprovide to Buyer at Settlement' (a) an amortization schedule based on the above terms; (b) q written disdosum of
the total Interest Bayer will pay to maturity of the Nets; and (o) the annual percentage rate on the Note based on kmn dosing
ooste.
1 TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS, In addition to the payments referenced in Section 2 above, Buyer shell also bo responsible
fan (a) property taxes; <b) homeowners asaoctefion dues; (c) ipectel assessment*; and (d) hazard insurance premiums pn the
Property. "Tbew obligations will be peAA: [ I directty to Setoff fectvw Agent on * monthly basis (XI directly io me
applicable aounty treasurer, a wocurtton, and in*uranco con* p*ny as require4 by those entftws,
4, PAYMENT* Buye^ p*Ymfnte under 8ectfons 2 and 3 abc** vvlU be made to: I ] goiter [XI an Escrow Agent If an
e&orow Agent, TQj^ fay B U Y E R
will act as Escrow Agsnt and wtll b<& responsible for disbursing payments
on any undectylng mongage or deed of twet (the 'underlying mortgage*) and to the Seller. Cost of catting up the escrow account
shall be paid try: [ 1 Buyer I 1 toiler [XI *pKt ovtnly between the parties
$. LATE PAYMENT/PREPAYNENT*
Ahy payment not made within j 5
day$ after It Is duetosubject to a late charga
or
of * N f t
5 _,, % of the installment due, whichever b gceater, Am^untfi in detatftt shall bear interest at a rata
offi ._,_ .. <K per annum. All or pert of the principal balanoo on tho Note may bo paid prior to maturity without permtty,
15. DUEOftSALfc- Aspidtfthe8«U*rDtado^
of tho undeHying mort^afifo, thtp note secured (hereby, and the amorttattour achedufy Buyefa obr^a^on to purchase under thb
ContmctfecondWoned upon B u y ^ approval of #w oontertl of thoae dgcumenta, Irt acoonjgnoe wtth 5eoHtm a of the RK'C.
tf the hotdtr of the vnd^dyma mor^jega c*iis the loan due ©a a result of thfe ta^satflon, Buyer agiteea to diecharge the
underlying tean &s reared by the mortgage tender, in auch event ^eOQ^ rBmainihg oaatty shall be paid i r provided in the
credit documents.
7. BUYER DISCLOSURES. Buyer has provide tg Settor, as a reqafredpart of this ADDQ^DUM, the attached Buyer Financial
tnfemiafiw Sheet wyer may use the Buyer Financial trtfocmaHpn Sheet approve^ by the Real Eetete Cemmii&^oh and the
Attorney General's Ofltoa, or may provide comparable written Information in a dtfl^ortt format, together with such additional
Information as Seller may reasonably requite Buyer M WILL [ ] WILL NOT provide Se«er wtth copies of IRe return* for the
t#o preceding tax years. Buyer aoknowledgeeftietsefler may oomad Buyer's current employer W verlficadon of ontploymant
as represented by Buyer m the Buyer Financial Informotion fiheet
3, SELLER APPROVAL By the Salter Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24$) of the R£PC, Buyer «ha(( provide to
6eUer, et Buyer's expense, e current credK report on Buyer from a consumer credit reporting agency. Seller may use me on&dit
Page i of I pa$es
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report and the Information referencedtaSecfion 7 of thle Addendum ClBuy%r Ofectyurert to evaluate the t^tfit^tforthlrms of
Buyer,
M Seller Review, Sy the B/aiuetk>he& I n s p e c t
(he credit report mtd ih« Buyer Diaeto*uiteB to determinetftha content of the sjedlr report and the Buyer Dteckfcurea. it
stooepteWe, f f t h e c o n ^ of the otxfttvpcrtortrw Buyer D I ^
(a)pw^v^nobjec!fon«fo
providing written rwtfce to Buyer tjy the Evehiritafa & Inspection* Deadline rafe^nced h Sedlon 24<c$ of the REPC, The
&roterage< upon reoe|rf of a oapy of Setters written notfoe of canoeflettort,tfiedlreturn to Buyer fie Earnest Money Dcpoerl
8.2 Seller Objectione. If Seller dtfes hotrnirotdlatelycancel the TK^PC as presided above, Setter may, by the Evaluations
4 Inspections Deadline referenced in Section Z4{e) of the REPC, provide Buyar wft^ written objection* 9(jyer end Seller ehalt
b«v^ eeven calendar days after Buyer's n»dpt of the obfeotjona (the Tteepon&e P*4odv) m wnfch to ©gnse la writing upon the
manner of resolving Senate o^ectians. Buyer may, twit shall not be required to, reaihfe Soto's ofafeatona. If Seller and Buyer
have not agreed hi vwtfng upon the manner of resolving Seller1* objector?* Belter rhay caneel the REPC by ptovidtag written
noficoto Buyer no later th&nthta* calendar <feys after expiration of tfca Reispons© P#diod The Brokerage upon receipt of a copy
of Setter's written notice of cactceftitton, steBreturnto euyfcr th« Earnest Money Deposit
6.3 Failure to Object If Seller does net deliver a written objection to Bu^er regardaig the credit report of a Buyer
Disclosuretoythe B/aluaforTS&lnsp^^
in Sections 8.1 or Q^ of this ADDENDUM, the credit report end &/yer Ofedoeurw WSt be deemed approved by Seller,
9, TITLE INSURANCE. Buyer [fc| SHALL I J SHALL HOT providetoSeler a l e n ^ e policy of title insurance in the amgunt
of the tndebtednnee to the Seller, oitd shall payforsuofi pottoy «t Settlement
10. DISCLOSURE? OF TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER* By no later than Segment, Buyer and Seller shall disoJoee to
•ach other thefrreepediveSodal Security Numbgre or other appfo^We tax Mentifcrtlon numbers so that frey may wmpty whh
federal tews on reporting mortgage 'vtorrert Infilingswith the Internal Revenue Service,
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPD, Including all pnof addtftda and
counteroffers, these terms shatl oohtrol, AH ofherteema of the REPC, Including ell prtpr addenda and counteroffers, not modified
by this ADDENDUM shiH remain the eame, [XI Seller ( J Buyar*nall have unhl 6 * 0 0
t 1 AM [XI PM Mountain
Time an JfJFHlfl^ &f 2 0 0 7 . (Date?, to accept the terms of this SELLER FINtANCING ADDENDUM in eooordance with
Sedjjifl 2 3 / ftfwREPC, Unless 60 accepte d, tie offer as eocforthinflilsSELLER] FINANCING ADDENDUM shall kp*s.
jJuyWl*']

^JL>—,
Settw Sfgn««rg

1M7
J\ >&L
' (Daty (Time) V
,—

social Security Number

(Date) ( T « T K > ) P

[}Q BUyer M Belter^gnatOW

Social Security Number

ACOerrANCE/OOUNTEROFPER/REJECTlON
[ ] ACCEPTANCE { 1 Setter I 1 Buyer hereby accepts the*? terms,
\ COUMTfiHOFFHt t 1 S»Her ( ] Buy^r1 presents as « counteroffer thetetjmesetforthon the aftodied ADDENDUM

NO.., J L
Siynature)

~"

(Date) (Time)

(Signature)

(Date) (Time)

[ 1 REJECTION:! leetlerl 1 Buyer rojocte theferegoingSELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM.
(Sianature)
(D«t») (Time)
(Sgrdlore)
P ^ ) (""^J
ThlS
ro«MAPWO^BrTWUrWPE^eTATecof*#^ONAl«THeOH^WTHEOT^
eFFR^NRAUQWST17,1»88. rr»<S»UC6S AN080P««HDESiUjLPPB^U3LY^ROViaVpl8TO<«OFT»tePC«^
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Addendum G

Michael F Leavitt (9476)

-w

DURHAM JONES & PINECAR

192 East 200 North, Thiid Flooi
St George, Utah 84770
Phone. (435)674-0400
Fax:(435)628-1610
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
41483 04

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STkTE OF UTAH
SCOT T WILSON, an individual, and
TIFFANY WILSON, an individual,
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

ANGELA JOHNSON, an individual,

CkseNo 070500581

Defendant

Judge James L Shumate

The Court held a hearing on cross-motions for partial surrjmary judgment in the abovecaptioned mattei on Octobei 11,2007 Plaintiffs were representee by Michael Leavitt of the law
firm of Durham Jones & Pinegai Defendant was represented by Nathan Dorius of the law firm
of Bennett, Tueller, Johnson & Deeie The Court reviewed the mlemoranda submitted by the
parties and heaid argument
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACT
Based upon the arguments of the parties and the memoranda, the Court finds that there is
no dispute as tc the foVwing material factsSIG_2804I 1

]

L

Defendant, Angela Johnson, ('"Defendant") is t^ie owner of property located at

704 Soxith Anasazi Ciicle, Washington, Utah - the property at issue in this case ("Residence").
2.

Defendant listed the Residence for sale on or atbout December 1, 2006,

adveitising the fact that she was willing to seller -finance the transaction at 4.9% per annum
3.

On or about January 6,2007, Plaintiffs, Scott Wilson and Tiffany Wilson

("Plaintiffs") offered to puichase the Residence from Defendant, offering to pay $1,100,000 with
Plaintiff paying $20,000 in earnest money and $90,000 at closing, for a total of $ 110,000 down
and Defendant seller-financing $990,000..
4.

The Plaintiffs' offer was made on a standard R^al Estate Purchase Contract form

approved by the State of Utah, Division of Real Estate.
5.

The initial offer specified that the purchase pricb would be paid through seller

financing and contained the following language:
Theie [X] are [ ] are not addenda to this Contract containing
additional terms. If there ate, the teims of the following addenda
are incorporated into this Contract by this reference. [ ] Addendum
No 1 [X] Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/yA Loan
Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum [ ] LeadfBased Paint
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some transactions this
disclosure is required by law) [ ] Lead-Based Pa^nt Addendum (in
some transactions this addendum is required by l^w) [X] Other
(specify) Notice of'Interest Addendum.
6..

Along with the initial offer, and to specify the t^rms of the seller financing, the

Plaintiffs included a seller financing addendum ("Seller Financing Addendum") that specified
that Defendant would provide seller financing for the Residence in the principal amount of
$990,000.00 at 4 9% per annum for 360 months, with the first payment to begin May 1, 2007

STG 28041 1
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7

On 01 about January 8, 2007, Defendant executbd a counter offer, listed as

Addendum No 2, agreeing to accept $1,200,000 00 foi the purchase of the Residence and
"requiring a 72 hour time clause/option to keep the house on th^ market"
8_

Addendum No, 2 specifically states:
to the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict
with any provision of the REPC, including all prior addenda and
counteroffers, these terms shall control All other terms of the
REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, not modified
by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same.

9

Defendant's counteroffer made no mention of the Seller Financing Addendum,

and made no changes to any terms of the original offer, other than those noted in paragraph 7
above.
10

On that same date, the Plaintiffs executed Addendum No 3, counter-offering the

following: (a) purchase price of $1,150,000; (b) in lieu of 72 hop: clause, settlement to be 2-2307; (c) earnest money of $20,000 to be non-refundable and released to seller on 2-10-07; and (d)
all other terms and conditions to remain the same
11

On the same date, Defendant signed both the REPC and Addendum No. 3, but

did not sign the Seller Financing Addendum
12.

In spite of the changes in the ultimate price from Plaintiffs' initial offer to the

final agreement, the parties did not change the language of the REPC or the Seller Financing
Addendum, which stated that Defendant would finance $990,000 |as the seller and that Plaintiffs
would pay a total of $ 110,000 as a down payment
13

S7G 28041 1

The parties agreed to close on the sale of the Residence by February 23, 2007

3

14

On 01 about February 10, 2007, Defendant received the $20,000 earnest money

deposit check and negotiated it
15

Plaintiffs closed their end of the transaction onlFebruary 23, 2007 by signing,

among other documents, an All-inclusive Trust Deed in the amount of $1,035,000 00 and
bringing $98,625 42 to the closing officer
16~

At closing on February 23, 2007, Defendant did not sign the HUD-1 Settlement

Statement because she did not agree with the terms of the Seller Financing Addendum
17

The transaction did not close on February 23, 2007

18

Plaintiffs caused a Notice of Interest to be recorded against the Property after the

transaction did not close
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the above undisputed facts, the Court makes the tollowing conclusions of
law:
L

A justiciable controversy and actual conflict exists between Plaintiffs and

Defendant with respect to whether Defendant is bound by the te^ms of the Seller Financing
Addendum, specifically whether she agreed to finance the purchase of the Residence at 4 9% per
annum
2

Plaintiffs and Defendant are adverse to each otheij with respect to this controversy

and conflict
3

Plaintiffs and Defendant each have an interest to protect with respect to this issue

4

The issue \s ripe foi judicial review

S1G 28041 l
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5

As a result of Defendant's signature to Addendurh No 3, her acceptance of

Addendum No 3, and hei transmission of hei acceptance of Addendum No 3 to Plaintiffs,
Defendant agieed to the terms of the REPC and all addenda and counteroffers that weie not
changed by the terms of Addendum No 3
6

These enforceable terms include the fact that Defendant agieed to seller-finance

the transaction at 4 9% pei annum, as reflected in the Sellei Financing Addendum
7,

Plaintiffs and Defendant were bound by the terms of the REPC, Seller Financing

Addendum, and Addendum No 3
8

Plaintiffs were not in breach of the REPC, Sellei Financing Addendum, oi

Addendum No 3, and pei formed in accordance with those documents
9

The Notice of Interest that Plaintiffs caused to be recorded against the Property

was authorized by Utah Code Ann 57-9-4, and therefore, is not ajwrongful lien as stated in Utah
Code Ann Title 38, Chapter 9
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, Plaintiffs' Motion
fox Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs is DENIED

STG 28041 I
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DATED this

k

day of

2008

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UIAH

JUDGE
L SHUMATI
District Court Judge

Approved as to form:
Bennett lueller Johnson & Deere

£an A Monsoi
/Natha^S Doiius
Attorneys foi Defendant

STG 28041 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC

3

I hereby certify that an unsigned copy of the foregoing Orjder Gr anting Partial
Summary Judgment was ser/ed this \p

day of

TNPH

prepaid upon the following:
Sean A- Monson
Nathan S. Doiius
BENNETT, T U E I I E R , JOHNSON & DEERE

3165 E. Millrock Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake Cit y> UT 84121

egal Assistant

STG 28041 1
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Addendum H

^ i.S^GTO.4 COUNT-'
Michael F. Leavitt (9476)
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

192 East 200 North, Third Floor
St George, Utah 84770
Phone: (435) 674-0400
Fax: (435) 628-1610
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
41483.04

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT qOURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT WILSON, an individual, and
TIFFANY WILSON, an individual,

,oU

FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
v.
ANGELA JOHNSON, an individual,
Defendant.

Cas<i No. 070500581
Judge fames L. Shumate

The Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment in the abovecaptioned matter on May 11, 2008. Plaintiffs were represented by Michael Leavitt of the law
firm of Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C. Defendant was represented by Sean Monson of the law
firFL of Bennett, Tueller, Johnson & Deere The Court reviewed the Memoranda submitted by
tie parties and heard argument.

ZTC, ^56762 l

FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACJT
Based upon the arguments of the parties and the memoranda, the Court finds that there is
no genuine dispute of the following material facts:
L

This Court has previously determined that the Rea[l Estate Purchase Contract

("REPC") signed by the Plaintiffs and Defendant (collectively, "Parties") on or about January 8,
2007, including all addenda and counteroffers, not changed by the Serins of a document entitled
Addendum No. 3, was a binding agreement between the Parties.
2.

According to the REPC, the parties agreed to close|the transaction on February

23, 2007.
3.

On February 23,2007, the Wilsons closed their end of the transaction, signed all

documents, and deposited the appropriate funds with the title company.
4.

On the same date, Defendant went to the title company and signed most of the

closing documents, but refused to sign the HUD-1 Settlement Statement that was necessary to
close the transaction, and therefore, the transaction did not close.
5.

The REPC specifically states that in the event the sejller defaults, in addition to

return of the earnest money deposit, buyer may elect either to accept jfrom seller a sum equal to
the earnest money deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue seller tc| specifically enforce the
contract to, or pursue other remedies available at law.
6*

The REPC also grants the prevailing party, in the eve^t of litigation or binding

arbitration to enforce the REPC, an award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
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7.

Plaintiffs were the buyers in the REPC and paid an earnest money deposit of

$20,000, which has been retained by Defendant, the seller identified in the REPC.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the above undisputed facts, the Court makes tt(e following conclusions of
law:
1.

To prove breach of contract, a complaining party mtist show: (1) the existence of

a valid and enforceable contract; (2) performance by the Plaintiff; (3) breach of express
performance by the defendant; and (4) damages to the PlaiiAtiff resulting from the breach. See
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrooke & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, f32> 70 P3d 17.
2.

In the instant case, the REPC is a valid and enforceable agreement.

3.

Plaintiffs fully performed their obligations stated in the REPC.

4.

Defendant failed to perform her obligations in the REPC by failing to sign all

documents necessary to effectuate closing on the date agreed by the parties.
5.

Plaintiffs were damaged by Defendant's failure to perform.

6.

Plaintiffs have elected their remedy for compensatory damages by seeking a

return of their earnest money deposit of $20,000, and an amount equ^l to that of $20,000, for
total compensatory damages of $40,000.
7.

Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this action, and therefore, are entitled to an

award of attorney's fees and costs, in an amount to be determined.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT
IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, Plaintiffs have
judgment against Defendant Angela Johnson in the amount of $4(^,000, plus interest at the postjudgment rate of 5.42% per annum until paid.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs are awarded
reasonable attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined! by affidavit of counsel for
Plaintiffs, and that this judgment may be augmented to include additional reasonable attorney's
fees and costs necessarily expended in the execution of this judgment
DATED this

1 /

day of

zj ft ^1

2009.

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JUDGE JAMESlL. SI
District Court Jipge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that an unsigned copy of the foregoing OR)DER AND JUDGMENT was
served this ^ a v

of d a n .

2009, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid upon the following:

Sean A. Monson
Nathan S. Dorius
BENNETT, TUELLER, JOHNSON & DEERE

3165 E. Miilrock Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84121

Legal Assista:
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